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Informalisation in international labour regulation policy: profiles of an unravelling 
 
Deirdre McCann1 
 
In Diamond Ashiagbor (ed) Imagining Labour Law for Development: Informal Work in the 
Global North and South (Oxford: Hart Publishing) (in publication, December 2018) 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The ILO Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy Recommendation, 2015 (No. 
204) introduced a novel objective to international-level policy on informal work: that states 
should, as a key element of formalisation policies, prevent informalisation. Awareness of 
informality, as Ashiagbor points out,2 and as the contributions to this volume testify, is 
invigorating the debates on the role, form, and future of labour regulation. Yet informalisation 
as a discrete process has tended to be neglected in informality policy. It is therefore crucial to 
single out informalisation as a distinct element of the evolving growth in informality, and to 
reflect on the demands that it imposes on law and policy.  
 
This chapter is the first scholarly investigation of informalisation in global labour 
regulation policy. The chapter explores how recent regulatory discourses absorb and convey 
the processes of informalisation, with a particular focus on the role of legal regulation. Section 
Two highlights anxiety about the expansion of informal work, including in middle- and high-
income countries, situating the problem within the ‘unacceptable forms of work’ framework. 
Section Three explores the academic literature on the regulatory dimension of informality, 
highlighting two crucial insights - that informality exists on a continuum, and that legal 
regulation mediates the shifting boundaries between the formal and the informal. Section 
Four examines informalisation in international regulatory policy. The regulatory sites 
examined are the pivotal transnational spheres of the World Bank and the International 
Labour Organization (ILO). Section Five concludes that a shift in ILO informality discourses to 
embrace informalisation is significant, but has not been absorbed in the Organization’s 
conception of the functioning or potential of labour regulation. It argues that informalisation 
must be better integrated into the formalisation project, including as an objective of 
improving and sustaining job quality in the formal economy. As a crucial element of this 
project, the chapter concludes by calling for a new approach to labour law - a pre-emptive 
approach - that is aimed at preventing the unravelling of decent jobs.  
 
2. POST-CRISIS INFORMALITY AND THE UNACCEPTABLE FORMS OF WORK PARADIGM   
 
Prominent in analyses of the enduring fallout of the global financial and economic crisis are 
signs of the expansion of informal economies, including in middle- and high-income 
                                                          
1 Durham Law School, deirdre.mccann@durham.ac.uk. Research that contributes towards this chapter was 
conducted with the support of a  Leverhulme Research Fellowship, Project on Creative Uncertainty?: Labour 
Market Regulation in a World of Doubt (RF-2015-547).  
2 Diamond Ashiagbor [CHAPTER IN THIS VOLUME]. 
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countries.3 Disproportionately associated with poverty, poor job quality and insecurity,4 any 
growth in informal work poses a formidable risk to efforts to reduce work-centred poverty, 
and is therefore a broader challenge to social and economic development.5 The outcomes 
embrace a range of deficient labour practices, including the delay or non-payment of wages, 
excessive hours, unpaid overtime, high earnings volatility, risky health and safety conditions, 
and the denial of collective rights.6 It is also clear that deficient manifestations of informal 
work are disproportionately concentrated among historically-disadvantaged groups, 
including women and young workers.7  
 
For these reasons, this chapter situates the problem of informality, and its expansion, 
in the presence of unacceptable forms of work (UFW).8 This notion is derived from a recently 
emergent ILO policy discourse that singles out UFW as a site of urgent action, defining these 
working relations as jobs in ‘conditions that deny fundamental principles and rights at work, 
put at risk the lives, health, freedom, human dignity and security of workers or keep 
households in conditions of extreme poverty.’9 An associated research project has since 
generated a conceptual framework - a Multidimensional Model - to identify and address UFW, 
designed as a diagnostic tool for local actors in economies at a range of levels of 
development.10 A premise of the Multidimensional Model is that informal work is not 
inevitably unacceptable, yet, given its association with UFW, a site that is ripe for regulatory 
intervention.11  
 
3. INFORMALISATION: TOWARDS THE REGULATORY CONDUITS  
                                                          
3 Johannes Jütting and Juan R. de Laiglesia (eds), Is Informal Normal? Towards More and Better Jobs in 
Developing Countries, (Paris, OECD, 2009). See also Henrik Huitfeldt and Johannes Jütting, ‘Informality and 
Informal Employment’ in OECD, Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: Employment and Social Protection (Paris, OECD, 
2009), 95-108; M. Anne Visser, ‘A Floor to Exploitation? Social Economy Organizations at the Edge of a 
Restructuring Economy’ (2016) 31 Work, Employment and Society 782. 
4 eg Martha Chen, ‘Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the Formal Economy and the Formal 
Regulatory Environment’ in Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis, Ravi Kanbur, and Elinor Ostrom (eds), Linking the Formal 
and Informal Economy: Concepts and Policies (Oxford, OUP, 2006); David Kucera and Theodora Xenogiani, 
‘Persisting Informal Employment: What Explains It?’ in Jütting and de Laiglesia ibid.   
5 Jütting and de Laiglesia ibid at 13. 
6 Martha Alter Chen, ‘The Informal Economy: Recent Trends, Future Directions’ (2016) 26(2) New Solutions 
155; OECD, Employment Outlook (Paris, OECD, 2015), ch 5; Françoise Carré́ and James Heintz, ‘Toward a 
Common Framework for Informal Employment across Developed and Developing Countries,’ WIEGO Working 
Paper (Statistics) No 26 May 2009 (revised March 2013), 9. 
7 ILO, World of Work (Geneva ILO 2014); on Africa, James Heintz and Imraan Valodia, ‘Informality in Africa: A 
Review’ WIEGO Working Paper No. 3, September, 2008, 8.   
8 See further Deirdre McCann and Judy Fudge, ‘Unacceptable Forms of Work : A Multidimensional Model’ 
(2017) 156 International Labour Review 147. 
9 In the 2013 report to the International Labour Conference, the ILO Director-General included UFW among 
Areas of Critical Importance for the Organization, ILO, Towards the ILO Centenary: Realities, Renewal and 
Tripartite Commitment Geneva (Geneva, ILO, 2013), para 49. Action on UFW has since been incorporated as an 
objective of the ILO’s contribution to the UN 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals. See 
www.ilo.org/global/topics/dw4sd/lang--en/index.htm. 
10 McCann and Fudge, ‘Unacceptable Forms of Work’ (n 8); McCann and Fudge, ‘A Strategic Approach to 
Regulating Unacceptable Forms of Work’ Journal of Law and Society, forthcoming 2019. See further Project on 
Legal Regulation of Unacceptable Work, supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) 
through the Global Challenges Research Fund [Grant no. ES/P00746/1] 
https://www.dur.ac.uk/law/policyengagement/ufw/ufw/. 
11 McCann and Fudge, ‘Unacceptable Forms of Work’ (n 8). 
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The global crisis propelled informalisation to the forefront of the debates on rising 
informality.12 This notion has been attached to a range of definitions in the policy and 
scholarly literatures, pointing to a risk of a conceptual incoherence.13 Some definitions are 
insufficient to anchor a robust conception of informalisation. The term periodically functions, 
for example, to denote expanding informality: the broader trend towards labour markets that 
are significantly characterised by the presence of informal work.14 Sharper imagery of 
informalisation, however, has been associated with the shift in the international policy realm 
from an enterprise-centred notion of informal work to a job-centred model.15 This shift in the 
models of informality has embraced a more refined account of processes of informalisation 
within the formal economy. The earlier enterprise-centred conceptions - hinging on 
enterprise-size and legal status - neglected key manifestations of informal work, and in 
particular excluded the formal sector, missing the dynamics of informalisation.16 More recent 
models, underpinned by the job-centred rendition of informality (‘all economic activities by 
workers and economic units that are - in law or in practice - not covered or insufficiently 
covered by formal arrangements’17) capture the diversity of informal employment across 
countries at different levels of development.18 These models encompass informal jobs in the 
formal sector: that a ‘growing proportion of jobs possess what may be called informal 
characteristics, i.e. without regular wages, benefits, employment protection, and so on.’19 
 
The evolution towards job-centred conceptions of informality has crystallised 
informalisation as a distinct dynamic of informality of increasing significance. As Standing has 
pointed out, traditionally informal economic activities were taken mainly to encompass the 
means of survival of the rural and urban poor.20 In more recent decades - in both industrialised 
and industrialising countries - there has been a trend towards enterprises informalising their 
                                                          
12 eg Jütting and de Laiglesia, Is Informal Normal (n 3). 
13 Kanbur has raised a similar objection to the notion of informality, Ravi Kanbur , ‘Conceptualising Informality: 
Regulation and Enforcement’ 2009 52(1) The Indian Journal of Labour Economics 33, 33. 
14 eg James Heintz and Robert Pollin, ‘Informalization, Economic Growth and the Challenge of Creating Viable 
Labor Standards in Developing Countries,’ Political Economy Research Institute, Working Paper Series 60, June 
2003. 
15 On this shift, see Carré and Heintz ‘Common Framework’ (n 6); Elizabeth Hill Worker Identity, Agency and 
Economic Development: Women’s Empowerment in the Indian Informal Economy (London, Routledge, 2010); 
Supriya Routh ‘Building Informal Workers Agenda: Imagining ‘Informal Employment’ in Conceptual Resolution 
of ‘Informality’ (2011) 2(3) Global Labour Journal 3; Martha Chen ‘The Informal Economy: Definitions, Theories 
and Policies,’ WIEGO Working Paper No 1, 2012); Colin Williams and Mark Lansky, ‘Informal Employment in 
Developed and Developing Economies: Perspectives and Policy Responses’ (2013) 152 International Labour 
Review 355, and the discussion in McCann and Fudge ‘Unacceptable Forms of Work’ (n 8) at pp 165-66. See 
further Section 4.2 below. 
16 International Conference of Labour Statisticians Resolution Concerning the International Classification of 
Status in Employment, Adopted by the 15th International Conference on Labour Statisticians (Geneva, ILO, 
1993). 
17 ILO Resolution concerning Decent Work and the Informal Economy (Geneva, ILO 2002) para 3. See Section 
4.2 below. 
18 ILO ibid; International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) 2003 Guidelines concerning a Statistical 
Definition of Informal Employment (Geneva, ILO, 2003); Chen ‘Rethinking the Informal Economy’ (n 4), Chen 
‘The Informal Economy’ (n 4); ILO, Statistical Update on Employment in the Informal Economy (Geneva, ILO, 
2012). 
19 Guy Standing, ‘Global Feminisation Through Flexible Labor: A Theme Revisited (1999) 27 World Development 
583, 585. 
20 Ibid, at 587. 
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labour processes. Standing and others have linked the rise in flexible labour relationships from 
the 1980s, to informalisation across the world, including through formal firms in the global 
North that sub-contract production to workers in developing countries.21  
 
Informalisation has long been recognised in low-income settings. In this regard, 
Theron, on the South African experience, offers contrasting notions of informalisation ‘from 
above’ and ‘from below.’22 The latter captures the conceptions of informality that are familiar 
from the literatures on the global South: individual workers devising survivalist strategies in 
response to job losses.23 ‘Informalisation from above,’ more pertinently for present purposes, 
equates with the notion of informalisation pursued in this chapter: it unfurls through the 
capacity to bypass labour laws by resorting to either outsourcing or retrenchment.24 This 
process has been identified in recent years, for example, in the signs from India and a number 
of African countries that growing numbers of workers in the small formal sectors are not 
protected by labour law, including through outsourcing and sub-contracting.25  
 
Awareness of comparable trends in higher-income settings is more recent. Early in the 
post-crisis era, for example, Jütting and de Laiglesia spotted a growing trend towards 
informalisation in OECD countries, which they attributed to heightened international 
competition in the course of globalisation, offering as an example the phenomenon of false 
self-employment.26 Visser has also pointed to an expansion of the informal economy in 
industrialised economies that is limiting access to benefits, training opportunities, access to 
social services, security, and the right to organise.27 
                                                          
21 Standing ibid, at 585. See also Martha Alter Chen, ‘Rethinking the Informal Economy: Linkages with the 
Formal Economy and the Formal Regulatory Environment,’ DESA Working Paper No. 46 ST/ESA/2007/DWP/46, 
July 2007, 9, citing Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York, Basic Books, 
1984).  
22 Jan Theron, ‘Informalization from Above, Informalization from Below: The Options for Organization’ (2010) 
11 (2 & 3) African Studies Quarterly 87. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. Drawing on this model, Webster et al have recently analysed the South African private security industry 
as engaging in ‘informalisation from above,’ as employers gradually increase outsourcing to labour-brokers and 
workers are de facto excluded from the operation of many labour laws. Edward Webster, Katherine Joynt and 
Thabang Sefalafala, ‘Informalization and Decent Work: Labour’s Challenge’ (2016) 16(2) Progress in 
Development Studies 203, citing T. Sefalafala, Precarious Work: A Case Study of Security Guards in Johannesburg 
(Johannesburg, University of Witwatersrand, 2012). 
25 Heintz and Valodia, ‘Informality in Africa’ (n 7); Paul Benjamin (assisted by Urmilla Bhoola), ‘Subordination, 
Parasubordination and Self-Employment: A Comparative Study of Selected African Countries’ in Giuseppe Casale 
(ed), The Employment Relationship: A Comparative Overview (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Kamala 
Sankaran, ‘Flexibility and Informalisation of Employment Relationships’ in Judy Fudge, Kamala Sankaran and 
Shae McCrystal (eds), Regulating Work: Challenging Legal Boundaries (Oxford, Hart, 2012); R Agarwala, Informal 
Labour, Formal Politics and Dignified Discontent in India (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013); 
Dibyendu Maiti, ‘Precarious Work in India: Trends and Emerging Issues’ (2013) 57 American Behavioral Scientist 
507. 
26 Jütting and de Laiglesia, Is Informal Normal? (n 3). 
27 Visser, ‘A Floor to Exploitation?’ (n 3) at 5, citing Visser, Race, Poverty, and State Intervention in the informal 
Economy: Evidence from South Africa (New York, New School University 2011). On informalisation in the global 
north, see further Colin C. Williams and Frédéric Lapeyre, ‘Dependent Self-Employment: Trends, Challenges 
and Policy Responses in the EU,’ International Labour Office, Employment Policy Department, Working Paper 
No. 228, 2017. On Japan and South Korea, see Fang Lee Cooke and Yumei Jiang, ‘The Growth of Non‐Standard 
Employment in Japan and South Korea: The Role of Institutional Actors and Impact on Workers and the Labour 
Market’ (2017) 55 Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources 155. On Norway, see John Fredrik Rye, ‘Negotiating 
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An intriguing element of the more recent academic work, in this regard, is that it is beginning 
to engage much more energetically with the regulatory conduits to informalisation. The 
informality literature has often been received, with justification, as adrift from the 
preoccupations of legal scholarship: identified and elaborated primarily by economists; ill-
suited and neglectful of the intricacies, objectives, and structures of labour regulation.28 La 
Hovary, centrally, has voiced dissatisfaction with the concept of the informal economy and 
cast doubt on its promise for effective policy intervention.29 Yet the evolution of the 
informality narrative has the potential to illuminate the present regulatory era, precisely 
because it is approaching with more rigour and precision the relationship between formality 
and informality and the channels that link them. Two insights from the literature are 
particularly useful for conceptualising informalisation: that informality exists on a continuum, 
and that legal regulation mediates the shifting boundaries between the formal and informal. 
 
3.1 Informality as a continuum 
 
The trajectory in the informality literature is towards an extended, more probing, 
destabilisation of the dichotomy of the formal and informal. The resultant imagery is of 
informality as existing on a continuum in which working relationships are compliant with 
certain legal sub-fields, or specific obligations, but not others.30 Along this continuum, there 
is an increasingly restricted engagement with regulatory obligations and requirements and an 
increasingly inhibited access to a range of legal protections and entitlements - in the labour 
dimension, protection from arbitrary dismissal, for example, work/family entitlements, rights 
to equality, to organise, and collectively to bargain, social security benefits, training 
opportunities etc.31 
 
These observations may appear fairly mundane, at first glance, from the vantage point 
of labour law scholarship. The uneven protection offered by labour and social protection 
frameworks has long been highlighted in the literatures on non-standard work and 
precariousness. This literature has unfurled, at least in part, as ‘gap analyses’ that have 
                                                          
Neoliberalism: Informalisation and Reformalisation of Industrial Relations in Norway’s Agricultural Industry in 
the 21st Century’ (2017) 32 Population, Space and Place . On the UK, see Sam Scott ‘Informalisation in Low-
wage Labour Markets: A Case Study of the UK Food Industry’ (2017) Population, Space and Place. See also 
Chen, ‘Rethinking the Informal Economy’ (note 4) at 5.  
28 Claire La Hovary ‘The Informal Economy and the ILO: A Legal Perspective’ (2014) 4 International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 391. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Visser ‘A Floor to Exploitation?’ (n 3) at 5, citing Jamie Peck and Nik Theodore, ‘Politicizing Contingent Work: 
Countering Neoliberal Labour-Market Regulation…From the Bottom Up?’ (2012) 111(4) South Atlantic 
Quarterly 741. 
31 Williams et al have applied this model to an investigation of South-East European countries by drawing on 
data from a 2007 Eurobarometer survey, Colin C. Williams, Abbi Kedir, Sara Nadin and Tim Vorley, ‘Evaluating 
the Extent and Nature of the Informalization of Employment Relations in South-East Europe’ (2013) 19(2) 
European Journal of Industrial Relations 91. This framework, however, is centred primarily on the extent of 
firm declaration to regulatory authorities, therefore capturing primarily the overlap of formality and 
informality in which workers are paid two distinct wages (the officially declared wage and an undeclared 
counterpart), at 94). 
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mapped uneven coverage, exiled workers, and lost protections in higher-income countries.32 
The informality literature, however, has a particular vigour in unveiling the complex 
dependencies between the realms of formality and informality, their dynamic interaction, and 
the repercussions for legal standards and worker protection across the economy as a whole.33 
Visser’s recent analysis is particularly adept, 
 
[T]hese ‘economies’ are not distinct separate spheres of economic activity. 
Rather, they are engaged in a complex dialectical relationship through which 
a structural dependency is continuously constructed and reinforced by 
labour and material supply chains facilitated under policy and market 
practices that promote deregulation in the formal economy. The formation 
of these supply chains, in turn, induce the expansion of the informal 
economy which manifests in increased levels of employment ‘informality’ or 
‘precarity’ in the formal labour market and results in the embedding of 
informal labour markets and economic activity within the formal economy.34   
 
3.2. Legal regulation as mediating the informality boundary  
 
Relatedly, as Sassen noted comparatively early in the debates, ‘the informal economy can 
only be understood in its relation to the formal economy.’35 Informality can be identified, that 
is, only because there exists an institutional framework for economic activity through which 
the state regulates working relations.36 Sassen’s observation serves, first, further to reinforce 
that informal economies are not distinct economic spheres: they are ‘[d]eeply embedded 
within the formal economy and socially and legally regulated by a battery of social 
institutions.’37 Second, this analysis emphasises that it is legal regulation, including labour law 
frameworks, that mediate the ragged boundary between the informal and formal dimensions 
of working relationships. 
 
The latter insight is particularly valuable for conceptualising the mechanisms of 
informalisation that channel workers from formality to informality, which need to be 
identified in detail and with precision. Lacunae or deficiencies in regulatory regimes and 
institutions shape the formality/informality boundary. Legislation permits, facilitates, or 
neglects paths to worker protection, and formal employers devise strategies that respond to 
these regulatory prompts. The scholarship points in particular to externalisation strategies - 
in their myriad forms - as a central conduit to informalisation: hiring on a casual basis, for 
example, outsourcing or sub-contracting to small firms or home-based workers, securing 
                                                          
32 eg Sandra Fredman, ‘Labour Law in Flux: The Changing Composition of the Workforce’ (1997) 26(4) Industrial 
Law Journal 337-352; Leah Vosko (ed) Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in 
Canada (Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000); Judy Fudge and Rosemary Owens (eds), Precarious 
Work, Women and the New Economy: The Challenge to Legal Norms (Oxford, Hart, 2006); Deirdre McCann 
Regulating Flexible Work (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008); Vosko Managing the Margins: Gender, 
Citizenship and the International Regulation of Precarious Employment (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010). 
33 Visser, ‘A Floor to Exploitation’ (n 3).  
34 Ibid, at 4. 
35 Saskia Sassen, ‘Informalization in Advanced Market Economies,’ Issues in Development Discussion Paper 20 
ILO 1999, 2. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid at 4. 
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labour through temporary agency or labour-hire arrangements, or tolerating or facilitating 
false self-employment.38 Relatedly, the scope of coverage of protective labour legislation, and 
in particular fealty to traditional conceptions of the employment relationship, deprive 
workers of legal recognition or protection where the employment relationship is either 
disguised or an ill-fit with conventional models.39 Other conduits include the failure of 
legislative frameworks adequately to incorporate dispersion of the responsibilities of 
employment among multiple entities, the punitive intersection of regulatory fields, notably 
labour and immigration laws,40 and ineffective enforcement regimes.41 
 
The guiding contemporary notion of informality, then, loops together the regulatory 
dimensions of precariousness, in particular where it manifests in non-standard work, 
deficiencies in the implementation and enforcement of labour laws, and the intersection of 
regulatory regimes. The research on informality is therefore paralleling advances in the labour 
regulation literatures in producing a holistic picture of labour law’s uncertain or deficient 
outcomes. Most notably, the notion of ‘regulatory indeterminacy’42 is playing a parallel role, 
including as it has been elaborated to identify and to link key drivers of the indeterminate 
impacts of labour regulation, identified as fragmentation, institutional interactions, and 
enforcement efficacy.43 This complexity renders the concept of informality inevitably 
challenging to operationalise for statistical measurement and comparison, as Deakin et al 
argue in this volume.44 Yet the notion is nonetheless valuable at the conceptual and policy 
levels, to clarify the regulatory conduits to informality and to fashion suitably expansive and 
coherent policy responses.  
 
Towards such policy interventions, these insights are revealing how legal frameworks 
shape the incidence and texture of informality. Yet they also suggest that legal regimes can 
be designed to curb or to alleviate the detrimental outcomes that are associated with 
informal work. It is evident, for example, that countries at similar income-levels exhibit 
significant variations in the incidence of informality.45 These varying outcomes suggest the 
need for an attentiveness to the policy mix, including to the role of the state in generating 
and preventing informalisation. In this regard, informalisation can be conceived of as a 
                                                          
38 M. Vanamala, ‘Informalisation and Feminisation of a Formal Sector Industry: A Case Study’ (2001) 36(2) 
Economic and Political Weekly 2378-2383+2385-2389; Standing, Global Feminisation (n 19); Theron, 
‘Informalisation from Above’ (n 22); Peck and Theodore, ‘Politicizing Contingent Work’ (n 30); Webster et al, 
‘Informalization and Decent Work’ (n 24). 
39 Chen ‘Rethinking the Informal Economy’ (note 4) at 8. 
40 Peck and Theodore ‘Politicizing Contingent Work’ (n 30) at 753. 
41 See eg Leah F. Vosko, John Grundy, and Mark P. Thomas, ‘Challenging New Governance: Evaluating New 
Approaches to Employment Standards Enforcement in Common Law Jurisdictions’ (2016) 37(2) Economic and 
Industrial Democracy 373. 
42 Simon Deakin and Prabirjit Sarkar, ‘Assessing the Long-Run Economic Impact of Labour Law Systems: A 
Theoretical Reappraisal and Analysis of New Time Series Data’ (2008) Industrial Relations Journal 453. 
43 Sangheon Lee and Deirdre McCann, ‘Regulatory Indeterminacy and Protection in Contemporary Labour 
Markets: Innovation in Research and Policy’ in Deirdre McCann, Sangheon Lee, Patrick Belser, Colin Fenwick, 
John Howe and Malte Luebker (eds), Creative Labour Regulation: Indeterminacy and Protection in an Uncertain 
World (Geneva, ILO/Palgrave, 2014) 3. 
44 Simon Deakin, Shelley Marshall, and Sanjay Pinto, ‘Labour Laws, Informality, and Development: Comparing 
India and China’ [IN THIS VOLUME]. 
45 Sangheon Lee and Deirdre McCann ‘Measuring Labour Market Institutions: Conceptual and Methodological 
Questions on “Working Hours Rigidity”’ in Janine Berg and David Kucera (eds), In Defence of Labour Market 
Institutions: Cultivating Justice in the Developing World (Geneva, ILO and Palgrave MacMillan, 2008). 
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process, often in flux, and channelled through diverse conduits. This process is not inevitable, 
but can be shaped, tempered, or reversed by regulatory intervention. It is crucial, then, to 
track the regulatory and institutional activity that engineers informalisation, and to craft 
policy measures that adequately respond. It is with this objective in mind that the key 
international regulatory policy responses - by the World Bank and ILO - are evaluated in the 
following Section. 
 
4. INFORMALISATION IN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY POLICY  
 
Given the evolving conceptions of informality traced in the previous Section, it is worth 
investigating the regulatory supports for informalisation are reflected in key policy discourses. 
To that end, this Section examines the most significant renditions of informalisation that are 
conveyed in international policy discourses. In this regard, the international is understood as 
a crucial site in which informality is conceptualised and the mechanisms to tackle it are 
constructed. The regulatory policy sites under consideration are the pivotal international 
spheres of the World Bank and the International Labour Organization (ILO). This Section builds 
on earlier work that has argued that the relationship between these institutions should be 
understood as a dynamic process of institutional convergence and divergence that is 
generating a conversation about the objectives, format and tenor of labour market 
regulation.46 The objective is to trace evolving notions of informalisation within broader 
narratives of informality; to investigate how these discourses capture and convey the nature 
and dynamics of informalisation; and in particular to highlight how each conveys the role of 
legal regulation. The Section is based on a review of the recent outputs of each of these 
transnational actors, with a particular focus on the evolving influence of the ‘plateau model’ 
of labour regulation developed in the World Bank’s World Development 2013, in particular in 
the Bank’s Doing Business project, and on ILO Recommendation No. 204 and the formalisation 
strategy that it embodies. 
 
4.1 Informalisation on the regulatory plateau: the World Bank 
 
Until recently, World Bank discourses on labour regulation strictly adhered to a dualist model 
of formal and informal work. The Bank’s regulatory policy has in recent decades primarily 
been associated with the Doing Business initiative - a set of indicators that measure and 
compare various elements of ‘business regulation’ in 190 countries, the results of which have 
been disseminated through a series of annual reports since 2003.47 The project engages with 
labour regulation through a Labour Regulation Index  - previously the Employing Workers 
Index - which measures and compares select labour protections (e.g. hiring, working hours, 
redundancy). Conventionally, as has been elaborated elsewhere, the policy discourse 
associated with Doing Business has conveyed labour regulation to float adrift from a discrete 
informal economy.’48 A pessimistic account of labour law’s promise relayed a clear-cut 
                                                          
46 Deirdre McCann, ‘Labour Law on the Plateau: Towards Regulatory Policy for Endogenous Norms’ in Alan 
Bogg, Anne Davies, and Jeremias Prassl (eds) The Autonomy of Labour Law (Oxford, Hart, 2015). 
47 World Bank, Doing Business 2004: Understanding Regulations (Washington DC, World Bank, 2003). 
48 Janine Berg and Sandrine Cazes, ‘Policymaking Gone Awry: The Labor Market Regulations of the Doing 
Business Indicators’ (2008) 29(4) Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 349-381; Sangheon Lee and Deirdre 
McCann, ‘The Impact of Labour Regulations: Measuring the Effectiveness of Legal Norms in a Developing 
Country’ in Lee and McCann (eds), Regulating for Decent Work: New Directions in Labour Market Regulation 
(Geneva, Palgrave MacMillan/International Labour Office, 2011); McCann ‘Labour Law on the Plateau’ (n 46). 
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dichotomy between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ economies.49 One consequence was the 
characterisation of rigid labour regulation as driving workers into the informal economy; 
another, the assumption that labour standards are unknown or entirely irrelevant to informal 
workers.50 Informalisation within formal settings was therefore largely overlooked: an 
‘informal sector’ was assumed and the informal workforce identified with that domain. 
 
The World Bank’s imagery of labour regulation has been refined since the limitations 
of the Doing Business initiative prompted reform of the project.51 With the Employing 
Workers Index (EWI) widely discredited for its conceptual and methodological limitations, the 
Bank showcased a new approach. A ‘plateau’ imagery was pioneered in the 2013 World 
Development Report (WDR2013).52 The Report identified twin risks - that labour regulations 
may be either too rigid or too lax - and contended that both can have detrimental effects.53 
An appropriate level of labour regulation is, instead, situated on a ‘plateau’ between excessive 
and lax labour regulation: ‘‘[l]abour policies that are not to undermine job creation, while 
maximizing development payoffs from jobs, must remain on this plateau.’ The plateau model 
was an important reset of the Bank’s frequently hostile engagement with labour regulation.54 
WDR2013 acknowledged research findings that labour laws do not inhibit job creation, 
entertained alternative explanations for poor employment outcomes, and acknowledged the 
benefits of legal regulation, including social objectives such as improved living standards and 
social cohesion.55 The outcry about the Doing Business methodology also prompted the Bank 
to rebrand the EWI as the Labour Regulation Index (LRI) and to incorporate questions on 
protective regulations (‘job quality’): on equal remuneration for work of equal value, 
measures to combat gender discrimination in hiring, maternity leave, paid sick leave, and 
unemployment protection.56 Insofar as ‘balance’ is a proxy for effective regulation, the quest 
for the regulatory plateau is welcome and has potential to illuminate efforts to conceptualise 
the regulatory dimensions of informalisation. In this respect, the Bank’s policy discourse 
parallels a central objective of the recent labour regulation literature: properly to 
conceptualise and to gauge the effectiveness of regulatory frameworks, including their role 
in generating and sustaining informality.57 Yet the plateau model has not been absorbed 
uniformly across the Bank’s labour regulation policy discourses. 
 
In the Doing Business project, at the rhetorical level the language of ‘balance’ is 
sustained: ‘[t]he challenge in developing labour policies is to avoid the extremes of over and 
                                                          
49 See, for example, World Bank Doing Business 2006 (Washington, DC, World Bank 2005); see further Lee and 
McCann, ‘The Impact of Labour Regulations’ (n 48). 
50 World Bank, ibid. 
51 See McCann, ‘Labour Law on the Plateau’ (n 46).  
52 World Bank World Development Report 2013: Jobs (Washington DC, World Bank, 2012). 
53 Ibid, p. 258. 
54 See further McCann, ‘Labour Law on the Plateau’ (n 46). 
55 World Bank, World Development Report 2013 (n 52), at 22. 
56 World Bank Doing Business 2016 (Washington DC, World Bank, 2015), at 159-160, Doing Business 2017 
(Washington DC, World Bank 2016), at 161-162. Doing Business 2016 included four questions that are not 
present in the  2017 report, on the availability of on-the-job training; whether an employee can create or join a 
union; the availability of administrative or judicial relief where there has been infringement of employees’ 
rights; the and availability of a labour inspection system, Doing Business 2016, at 160. 
57 eg Sangheon Lee and Deirdre McCann Lee, ‘New Directions in Labour Regulation Research,’ in Lee and 
McCann, Regulating for Decent Work: New Directions in Labour Market Regulation (Geneva, Palgrave 
Macmillan/ILO, 2011; McCann and Fudge, ‘Strategic Regulation’ (n 10).  
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under-regulation by reaching a balance between worker protection and flexibility.’58 An 
examination of the post-WDR2013 era evolution of this project, however, shows its fidelity to 
the plateau model to be uneven and poorly absorbed into the LRI methodology, including in 
relation to informality. Most fundamentally, there is no recognition that informality spans a 
continuum: the rendition of dichotomous informality and formality remains strikingly intact.59 
A central role for regulation in generating informality, further, is present, but it is ‘rigid’ labour 
regulation that continues to be identified as the culprit. Employment protection laws in 
particular are conveyed almost exclusively as drivers of labour market segmentation, relying 
on a small number of studies.60  
 
On the methodological level, the LRI is not attuned to capturing either the dynamics 
of informalisation or the legal mechanisms that are being tested to reorient these processes. 
Legal frameworks in fields other than labour law and social protection, are beyond the Index’s 
scope. It cannot, therefore, capture the diversity of legal regimes that regulate labour 
markets. Inevitably missing, in particular, is the harsh logic of the immigration frameworks 
that channel migrant workers into informal work.61 Even within the conventional parameters 
of labour law, however, the Doing Business methodology does not capture the regulatory 
supports of informalisation. The 2017 Report reverts to the evaluation of national labour 
regulation frameworks, following a post-reform hiatus in which the LRI findings were relayed 
without comment.62 The Report’s - laudable - conclusion is that regulation should be tailored 
to national circumstances and designed in collaboration with the social partners.63 The return 
to an evaluative strategy, however, purports to demonstrate the association of labour 
regulation with informal employment and unregistered firms64 (including through a reversion 
to the original nomenclature of a ‘rigidity of employment regulation’ index).65 This outcome 
is realised through a scoring system that has presumably been in abeyance since the reform 
of Doing Business, although it is not elaborated in detail in the Report.   
 
Yet despite the tenor of these conclusions, the LRI and the associated literature miss 
much of how regulation sustains informality, and, most pertinently for present purposes, 
channells informalisation. Elements can be singled out that are both central to the 
deficiencies of this project and of broader significance for the exploration of the regulatory 
dimensions of informalisation in international labour policy. First, the LRI is oriented towards 
                                                          
58 World Bank, Doing Business 2017 (note 56) at 87. 
59 See the discussion of employment protection legislation on p 87, referring to ‘dual labour markets, whereby 
a labour force becomes segmented into formal versus informal sector workers (in developing economies)….’ 
Ibid. 
60 Ibid, citing Simeon Djankov and Rita Ramalho, ‘Employment Laws in Developing Countries,’  Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Discussion Paper No. DP7097, December 2008; Siddharth Sharma, ‘Entry 
Regulation, Labor Laws and Informality,’ Working Paper 48927, World Bank, 2009; Norman V Loayza, Ana 
Maria Oviedo and Luis Serven, ‘The Impact of Regulation on Growth and Informality - Cross-Country Evidence,’ 
Policy Research Working Paper, WPS 3623, World Bank, 2005. 
61 eg Working Lives Research Institute, ‘Study on Precarious Work and Social Rights. Study arried out for the 
European Commission,’ VT/2010/084 (Working Lives Research Institute, London Metropolitan University, 
2012). 
62 World Bank Doing Business 2017 (n 56), Annex: Labour Market Regulation, pp 87-95. 
63 Ibid, at 87.  
64 Ibid, at Figures 10.1, 10.2, pp 88-89. 
65 Defined as the average of four sub-indices - hiring, working hours, redundancy rules and cost. See ibid eg 
Figure 10.1, p 88. 
11 
 
substantive standards - hours limits, rest periods, annual leave, redundancy protections, 
equal pay, maternity leave etc.66 The Index therefore misses central features of labour 
regulation frameworks, highlighted in Section 3.2 that are associated with informalisation. 
These tend to be found in the minutiae of labour law texts, rather than in their flagship 
protections. The LRI does not, for example, capture exclusions from protection, explicit or 
implicit. Nor does it, centrally, capture the personal scope of legal measures, typically tied to 
the presence of a judicially-endorsed ‘contract of employment’ and therefore elusive for 
many workers.67 
 
Second, and linked to the project’s tilt towards the substantive, Doing Business is 
unable to capture the crucial role of non-standard work regulation in propelling workers 
towards the informality continuum. In this regard, the Bank’s thin rendition of informality 
hosts a supplementary dichotomy: between formal and informal workers in developing 
countries and ‘permanent’ and ‘contingent’ workers in high-income economies.68 This 
account inevitably misses the parallel processes of informalisation in lower- and higher-
income countries, and the degree to which informality manifests as non-standard work in 
both. 
 
This deficiency crystallises in Doing Business’s treatment of fixed-term contracts, the 
only non-standard work-form that is tracked by the LRI. The hiring sub-index captures (1) the 
extent to which employers can hire workers on a fixed-term basis to perform permanent tasks 
and (2) the maximum duration of fixed-term contracts (including renewals).69 The Index is 
again assumed to capture rigidity; the merits of widespread fixed-term contracting is 
assumed.70 The 2017 Report asserts the potential of fixed-term contracts to enhance the 
employability of labour market entrants, particularly young workers, through providing 
experience and access to professional networks.71 There is little effort to convey the downside 
of short-term work,72 or to quantify or compare the protections increasingly available to fixed-
term workers in countries across the world: mandated maximum durations/renewals, for 
example, equal treatment, or conversion rights to open-ended contracts. 
 
Doing Business also continues to miss the actual strength of labour regulation, thus 
remaining open to the criticisms that have endured from the outset of the project about the 
Index’s failure to accommodate the observance of legal standards.73 In particular, the LRI does 
not capture enforcement - an enduring omission, long noted,74 central to the Doing Business 
reforms and touching on key elements of informality. Questions, further, that might offer 
some insight into informality channels were dropped in the 2017 report, on the availability of 
                                                          
66 The key exception is in the treatment of redundancy, which captures procedural requirements, but not 
exclusions from protection, ibid, at 161.  
67 That the worker subject to legal rules is an employee is a feature of the project’s ‘assumptions about the 
worker,’ ibid, at 160. 
68 Ibid, at 87.  
69 Ibid, at 161. 
70 Ibid, at 88. 
71 Ibid, at 88-89, citing OECD Employment Outlook 2014 (Paris, OECD, 2014). 
72 cf Arvo Kuddo, David Robalino, and Michael Weber, Balancing Regulations to Promote Jobs: From 
Employment Contracts to Unemployment Benefits (Washington, DC, World Bank 2015), 2-3. 
73 Lee and McCann, ‘Measuring Labour Market Institutions’ (n 45). 
74 ibid. 
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administrative/judicial relief where employees’ rights have been infringed and the presence 
of a labour inspection system.75 As a result, the Index risks inaccurate conclusions about the 
impacts of labour laws, including on informal work. 
 
While the extensive and punctual annual outputs of the Doing Business project tend 
to overshadow alternative narratives of labour regulation that emanate from the Bank, these 
periodically surface. The key comparator is WDR2013 and the literature that takes it as a point 
of departure. One is the 2015 report on Balancing Regulations to Promote Jobs (‘the Balancing 
report’), which emanates from the Bank’s Social Protection, Labor and Jobs realm and was 
produced in consultation with the ILO, International Trade Union Confederation and 
International Organization of Employers.76 The analyses that characterise this line of the 
Bank’s work have a more refined and expansive grasp of the regulatory dynamics of 
informalisation. WDR2013, for example, catches the de jure routes to informality, listing the 
features of legal frameworks that preclude protected status: exceptions - of domestic 
workers, small enterprises, export zones; the complexities of regulating multilateral working 
relationships; and limited access to adjudication mechanisms.77 The Balancing report also 
recognises the significance of non-standard work regulation, capturing key regulatory 
conduits and certain of the measures that are being trialled to reorder them.78 The report 
advocates protective regulatory frameworks for non-standard workers79: legislation that 
entitles temporary and part-time workers to protections equivalent to full-time workers,80 
restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts (citing ILO Convention No. 166 on preventing 
abusive recourse to fixed-term work),81 legislation to combat disguised employment,82 and 
requirements that employees receive written employment contracts.83  
 
4.2. The formalisation paradigm: the ILO 
 
ILO policy discourses on the informal economy have been attuned to the presence of 
informality in formal enterprises since the language of the ‘informal sector’ was replaced by 
the ‘informal economy’ at the turn of the century.84 As discussed in Section 3, a job-centred 
definition of informality was enshrined in the ILO’s 2002 Resolution and Conclusions 
concerning decent work and the informal economy since incorporated in the International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) 2003 Guidelines concerning a statistical definition of 
                                                          
75 Both were included in Doing Business 2016; see n 56 above. 
76 Kuddo et al (n 72).  
77 World Bank, World Development Report 2013 (n 52), at 156. 
78 Kuddo et al (n 72), ch 1. WDR2013 was weaker on non-standard work, offering few suggestions, for example, 
on the regulation of multipartite relationships, see McCann, ‘Labour Regulation on the Plateau’ (n 46). 
79 Kuddo et al  (n 46), at 4, citing ILO Employment Relationship Recommendation, 2006 (No. 198). 
80 ibid. 
81 The illustrations are limiting recourse to a specified period to cases in which, owing to nature of work or 
circumstances under which it is to be effected, or the interests of worker, the employment relationship cannot 
be of indeterminate duration; deeming contracts for a specified period to be contracts of employment of 
indeterminate duration; deeming contracts for a specified period that are renewed on one or more occasions 
to be contracts of employment. Ibid.  
82 Although with a curious definition that is confined to trilateral relationships; ibid, note 23. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Section 3 above. 
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informal employment85 and, ultimately, the Transition from the Informal to the Formal 
Economy Recommendation, 2015 (No. 204). This job-centred model, capturing economic 
activities that are insufficiently covered by formal arrangements in law or practice,86 always 
implicitly extended to formal-site informality, made explicit in the Recommendation’s 
coverage of ‘employees holding informal jobs in or for formal enterprises.87 
 
Evaluating the ILO instruments by drawing on the insights on the regulatory dimension 
of informality elaborated in Section 3 confirms their value in transmitting sophisticated 
conceptions of informality to the international labour policy arena. The ILO policy discourses 
embody the two insights highlighted in Section 3. First, they are alive to the continuum 
between the formal and the informal. Most strikingly, in the 2002 Resolution even the more 
expansive job-centred concept of the informal economy is conveyed as tending ‘to downplay 
the linkages, grey areas and interdependencies between formal and informal activities.’88 
Second, legal frameworks are recognised to govern the uneven boundary between formal 
and informal work, emphasising the crucial role of domestic legal regimes.89 
 
The ILO policy discourses are explicit in recognising informality as a problem of 
governance: 
 
Informality is principally a governance issue. The growth of the informal economy 
can often be traced to inappropriate, ineffective, misguided or badly implemented 
macroeconomic and social policies, often developed without tripartite 
consultation; the lack of conducive legal and institutional frameworks; and the lack 
of good governance for proper and effective implementation of policies and 
laws.90 
 
The ILO instruments also capture the diversity of the modes and forms of regulatory 
escape that are generated at this boundary. The 2003 Guidelines are most elaborate, 
incorporating a list  that includes non-declaration of jobs or employees, casual and temporary 
employment, working hours or wages below legal thresholds, work at home or beyond the 
premises of the employer, and jobs to which labour laws ‘are not applied, not enforced, or 
not complied with for any other reason.’91 The Recommendation’s scope provisions add 
explicit references to both individuals in subcontracting and supply chains92 and workers in 
‘unrecognized or unregulated’ employment relationships.93 The 2002 Resolution, most 
expansively, alludes to ‘grey areas’ in which the economic activity involves characteristics of 
                                                          
85 International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) 2003 Guidelines concerning a Statistical Definition of 
Informal Employment (ILO 2003). 
86 Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy Recommendation, 2015 (No. 204), para 2(a). 
87 Ibid, para 4(c) (also in the 2003 Guidelines (n 16), para 5(i)). 
88 ILO Resolution concerning Decent Work and the Informal Economy (n 17), para 3. 
89 ‘[S]ince a defining characteristic of workers and enterprises in the informal economy is that they often are 
not recognised, regulated or protected by law, the legal and institutional frameworks of a country are key.’ 
Ibid, para 16. 
90 The 2015 Recommendation is less assertive, noting informality ‘has multiple causes, including governance and 
structural issues…’ (Preamble).  
91 International Conference of Labour Statisticians (n 16), para 3(5). 
92 Recommendation No. 204 (n 86), para 4(c). 
93 Ibid, para 4(d). 
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both the formal and informal economy, such as workers in formal enterprises whose wages 
and working conditions are typical of those in informal work.94  
 
Processes of informalisation, however, were not central to the 2002 Resolution. 
Recommendation No. 204 is therefore pioneering in including  preventing the informalisation 
of formal economy jobs among its key objectives.95 Embracing the prevention of 
informalisation as an integral element of the formalisation project is a key contribution of the 
Recommendation that should not be understated. The preventive objective strengthens 
research and policy conceptualisations of the nature and dynamics of informality and is 
available to  shape global renditions of formalisation. Given its far-reaching potential, it is not 
surprising that the inclusion of this objective in the Recommendation was contested. The 
preparatory documents reveal that the objective was incorporated through an amendment 
to the International Labour Office proposed Conclusions that were deliberated upon by the 
Committee on Transitioning from the Informal Economy at its first discussion in 2014. 
Proposed by the Worker Vice-Chairperson, the amendment was opposed by the Employer 
counterpart on the grounds that the existing text was sufficient,96 highlighting that the stance 
of the international employer lobby would have precluded informalisation as an element of 
domestic formalisation policies.97 
 
The Recommendation is also robust on the breadth and mix of the policy response to 
informality, including to informalisation. In this regard, labour regulation can only be an 
element in a range of policy arenas that must be engaged to improve or discourage informal 
working relations. The Recommendation stresses the need for coherence and coordination 
across a wide range of policy fora including macroeconomic, employment, and social 
protection policies.98 Related ILO literature has also captured the role of formalisation 
strategies and legal regulation in a crafted policy mix that embraces macro-economic, 
monetary, financial sector, exchange rate, and public investment policies and favours job 
creation in the formal economy, structural shifts to higher productivity activities, and labour 
markets polices and institutions that enable transitions to formality.99   
 
                                                          
94 ILO Resolution concerning Decent Work and the Informal Economy (n 17), para 5. 
95 This aim is enshrined among a trilogy of key objectives in para 1(c), ‘Objectives and Scope,’ together with 
facilitating the transition of workers and economic units from the informal to the formal economy ‘while 
respecting workers’ fundamental rights and ensuring opportunities for income security, livelihoods and 
entrepreneurship’ (1 (a)); and promoting enterprises and decent jobs in the formal economy and the 
coherence of macroeconomic, employment, and social policies (1(b)).  
96 It was also opposed by the Africa Group of governments, see Report of the Committee on the Transition from 
the Informal to the Formal Economy: summary of proceedings, available at 
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_375370.pdf, 
paras 734-41.  
97 The International Organization for Employers (IOE) had earlier objected to the inclusion of the ‘informal in 
the formal’ in the standard-setting exercise. See La Hovary, ‘The Informal Economy and the ILO,’ (n 28) at 407-
408, citing IOE Proposed New ILO Standard(s) - Informal Economy (Geneva, IOE, 2013), 6. 
98 Paras 1, 7(d). It also calls for an ‘integrated policy framework…included in national development 
strategies…as well as in poverty reduction strategies and budgets….,’ para 9. 
99 eg ILO ‘Informality and the Quality of Employment in G20 Countries,’ Report prepared for the G20 Labour 
and Employment Ministerial Meeting, Melbourne, Australia, 10-11 September 2014, available at 
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---
publ/documents/publication/wcms_305425.pdf, 8-9. 
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Labour regulation initiatives that have the potential to curb informalisation are included 
in the Recommendation. These respond to the legislative mechanisms and employer 
strategies that generate and sustain pockets of informality. Governments, first, are called 
upon to ensure that workers are covered by labour laws. The Recommendation prompts ILO 
members to adopt, review, and enforce legal measures to ensure appropriate coverage and 
protection of all workers and economic units.100 Effective enforcement - part-constitutive of 
the parameters of informality in the job-centred model - is also extensively treated. States are 
encouraged to address avoidance of labour laws,101 to ensure recognition and enforcement 
of employment relationships,102 to strengthen inspection,103 to provide information and 
assistance on legal compliance,104 and to establish efficient and accessible complaint 
procedures.105 The Recommendation, third, calls for states to realise the fundamental 
principles and rights106 and ensure health and safety protections in informal work,107 
progressively extend social security, maternity protection, decent working conditions and a 
minimum wage to informal workers,108 and encourage the provision of affordable childcare 
and other care services.109 These recommendations are relevant to tackling informalisation, 
since parity of entitlements would curb the incentives associated with resorting to precarious 
forms of work.  
 
The Recommendation, further, does not betray the hesitancy about the international 
labour standards that has become characteristic of the ILO’s flagship policy discourses during 
the last decade.110 Recommendation No. 204 has a fairly robust embrace of the ILO standards, 
requesting member States to take into account a range of instruments that are listed in an 
Annex.111 Particularly useful, in this regard, is the presence of ‘non-standard work’ standards: 
the Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), which requires a degree of 
protection - albeit unambitious - for temporary agency workers112; the Employment 
Relationship Recommendation (2006) No. 198 - again flawed, but nonetheless a source of 
some guidance on the regulatory dimension of the formalisation project113; and the Home 
Work Convention, 1996 (No. 177) and Domestic Workers standards,114 both essential 
                                                          
100 Recommendation No. 204 (n 86), para 9. As part of ensuring compliance with national laws and regulations, 
states are also encouraged to ensure the recognition and enforcement of employment relationships, para 26. 
101 Ibid, para 22. The Recommendation also highlights a need to prevent and sanction deliberate avoidance of, 
or exit from, the formal economy to evade taxation and labour laws, para 7(l). 
102 Ibid, para 26. 
103 Ibid, para 27. 
104 Ibid, paras 28-29. 
105 Ibid, para 29. 
106 Ibid, para 16. 
107 Ibid, para 17. 
108 Ibid, para 18. 
109 Ibid, para 21. 
110 McCann, ‘Labour Regulation on the Plateau’ (n 46). 
111 Para 7(g). These standards do not include the Hours of Work Conventions. 
112 Convention No. 181 primarily preserves the rights to freedom of association and to bargain collectively 
(para 4), prohibits discrimination (para 5(1)), and requires signatories to provide ‘adequate protection’ in 
relation to a list of entitlements (para 11). 
113 The most convincing aspect of the Recommendation is the suggestion that governments mandate a legal 
presumption that an employment relationship exists where one or more indicators is present, para 11(b). 
114 Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) and Recommendation (No. 201). Both home work and 
domestic work are classified as ‘specific categories of workers’ in the Annex to Recommendation No. 204. On 
the potential for legal frameworks on domestic work to offer lessons for labour-protective formalisation 
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references for formalisation policies targeting crucial harbours of protective frailty in the 
global economy.115  
 
The Recommendation is not equally convincing, however, on what can be achieved by 
using such legal frameworks and techniques to combat informalisation. While preventing the 
unravelling of formal jobs is among the Recommendation’s objectives, the mechanisms that 
might stem the slide into informality are sparsely elaborated. Yet the regulatory options are 
numerous, diverse, and available for testing at local levels:116 equal treatment mandates, 
specific allocation of legal obligations in multilateral relationships, explicit distribution of 
responsibilities across value chains, restricting outsourcing or mandating protections for the 
outsourced workforce, working time techniques that limit fragmentation or that promote 
certainty in scheduling and wages, and specific protections for the range of forms of 
temporary, casual or multilateral work. 
 
To some degree, this limitation reflects that the Recommendation references the non-
standard work standards without fully absorbing the regulatory strategies that these 
instruments demand. The equal treatment model is a case in point. It has been observed that 
the Recommendation encourages the progressive extension of decent working conditions to 
informal economy workers.117 Yet one obvious route to this goal is an equality mandate that 
demands parity of treatment between non-standard and standard workers. One of the key 
models developed to ensure that non-standard working relationships - part-time, fixed-term, 
temporary agency - match the quality of standard-form jobs, the equality model, is being 
tested in legal frameworks across the world.118 This approach, further, is particularly apt for 
the dual-track complexion of formal-site informality, in which the differential treatment is 
accented by proximity. As the international spearhead of the equal treatment model,119 the 
Home Work Convention could have been drawn on to support a more expansive 
endorsement of the equal treatment model. This opportunity was neglected, however. Nor is 
the Part-Time Work Convention, 1994 (No. 175) included in the Recommendation’s Annex, 
although it elevated the equality approach to an economy-wide model and targets a core 
mode of fragmentation, through shortened hours.120 
 
In this regard and more broadly, Recommendation No. 204 parallels the World Bank 
literature by assuming the centrality of substantive protections. This point is further 
                                                          
strategies see Deirdre McCann and Jillian Murray, ‘Prompting Formalisation Through Labour Market 
Regulation: A “Framed Flexibility” Model for Domestic Work’ (2014) 43(3) Industrial Law Journal 319. 
115 McCann and Murray, ibid. 
116 On testing as a strategy, see Lee and McCann ‘New Directions in Labour Regulation Research’ (n 57).  
117 Para 18. Working time standards are notably absent. 
118 On the UK, for example, see McCann Regulating Flexible Work (n 32); Lisa Rodgers, Labour Law, 
Vulnerability and the Regulation of Precarious Work (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2016) ; on Korea, see JooHee 
Lee, ‘More Protection, Still Gendered: The Effects of Non-standard Employment Protection Acts on South 
Korean Women Workers’ (2017) 47(1) Journal of Contemporary Asia 46-65. 
119 Art 4. 
120 This omission may indicate a broader oversight, which fails to associate casualisation with working time 
arrangements rather than exclusively with contractual status; see further Deirdre McCann ‘New Frontiers of 
Regulation: Domestic Work, Working Conditions, and the Holistic Assessment of Nonstandard Work Norms’ 
(2012) 34(1) Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal 167; McCann and Murray, ‘Prompting Formalisation’ 
(n 114), McCann, ‘Travel Time as Working Time: Tyco, the Unitary Model, and the Route to Casualization’ 
(2016) 45(2) Industrial Law Journal 244.  
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illustrated by Section IV of the Recommendation (Employment Policies), which calls for 
measures to help low-income households to escape poverty, and includes wages policies such 
as the minimum wage.121 Wages policies, however, cannot adequately respond to the 
regulatory conduits to informalisation; in this case, legal structures that facilitate, or do not 
impede, casualisation. Fragmented work-forms, captured in equally splintered terminology 
(casual work, zero hours contracts, day labour etc.), are characterised by the absence of 
guaranteed hours and have harsh repercussions for the level and predictability of incomes. 
Yet these outcomes cannot be tempered by conventional wage policies.122 Necessary instead 
are novel - and at present only nascent - mechanisms designed specifically to regulate casual 
work. Other elements of the Recommendation are an equally poor match for the dynamics 
of informalisation. Section V (Rights and Social Protection) calls for measures to prevent 
avoidance of labour, tax, and social security laws. Yet the proposed strategies are exclusively 
configured towards smoothing the transition from informal to formal.123 The level of detail, 
most strikingly, on the routes to formalisation for micro and small economic units,124 while 
immensely helpful, is not matched by any comparable blueprint on preventing 
informalisation.  
 
These limitations are significant, not only because they weaken Recommendation No. 
204, but because they expose the centre of gravity of the international formalisation project. 
The project is tethered, that is, to a preoccupation with informal firms and settings. 
Informalisation is an adjunct. This outcome can be read as path dependence associated with 
the origins of the informality project, which also accounts for the late, and contested, entry 
of the preventive objective into the Recommendation. The assumed direction of travel is 
perhaps most stark in the objection of the Africa group of governments to the inclusion of the 
preventive objective, that ‘the subject of the [Recommendation is] the transition from the 
informal to the formal economy, not the other way around.’ 125 This objection crystallises an 
assumption about the orientation of the formalisation project, both within key ILO policy-
making bodies and across the international and national policy realms. This focus neglects the 
expansive imagery of informality, its emergence, and its potential solutions of the kind 
pursued in this volume. It exposes a broader threat to the rapidly-evolving formalisation 
project that is of particular risk to its legal architecture and impedes a vigorous role for this 
policy realm in combatting the informalisation of formal jobs. Emphasising cure over 
prevention, the outcome is that the key international policy discourse on informality does not 
grasp the symbiotic relationship between formalisation and prevention of informalisation. It 
therefore does not hold these targets in the sensitive balance that is needed to underpin 
sophisticated policy-making and effectively to allocate resources between the twin 
objectives. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS A REFINED CONCEPTION OF INFORMALISATION IN 
 GLOBAL REGULATORY POLICY 
                                                          
121 Para 15(d), mentioning also social protection schemes and public employment programmes. 
122 Para 15(d).  
123 Para 22. 
124 Para 25. 
125 See Report of the Committee on the Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy (n 96), at paras 
734-741. 
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This chapter has investigated the regulatory dimension of informality in global policy 
discourses with a focus on informalisation. It therefore responds to the relative neglect of 
informalisation within the policy debates on informal work. The chapter has observed that 
labour regulation literatures are devising refined conceptions of informality, which have a 
firmer grasp of the role of legal regulation in generating, shaping and sustaining informal 
work. Particularly crucial contributions from this literature were identified: the linked insights 
that informality is a continuum and that legal regulation governs a shifting boundary between 
formal and informal work. These notions are revealing when deployed to interrogate policy 
discourses. In this article, they have been drawn on to elaborate and to assess a recent turn 
in international labour policy towards the regulatory dimensions of informality. To this end, 
the chapter has examined policy discourses from the two most significant sites of global 
labour regulation policy, the World Bank and the ILO. 
 
This analysis has revealed an unsurprising divergence in the policy narratives that 
emanate from the World Bank and the ILO, accompanied by some revealing convergences. 
World Bank policy streams have unevenly absorbed the plateau model that was unveiled in 
the 2013 World Development Report, thereby sustaining a slippery grasp of informality that 
eschews the continuum model and, in the recent literature, has reverted to identifying ‘rigid’ 
protective regulation as the cause of informality. An examination of the Bank’s flagship Doing 
Business project has found these notions to be conveyed through a focus on substantive 
standards, a lack of attention to the regulatory conduits to informalisation, and an enduring 
neglect of labour regulation’s de facto influence on working relations, including the efficacy 
of state enforcement. Alternative narratives within the Bank are both less prominent and 
more promising, including in that they highlight legal measures that have been engineered to 
improve the treatment of workers in non-standard working arrangements.  
 
Recent discourses from the ILO are particularly significant, given the Organization’s 
status as the key global host of the formalisation project, the home of the sole international 
standard, and the most prominent international policy forum in which trade unions play an 
integral role. The ILO has long recognised informality that resides in formal settings and the 
Organization’s policy discourses are alive to certain of the associated regulatory dynamics. 
Yet informalisation was not a central preoccupation of the ILO until the inclusion of the 
preventive objective in Recommendation No. 204. The repercussions of this shift, further, 
have not been fully absorbed. Labour regulation mechanisms that can curb informalisation 
feature in the Recommendation, and it cites most of the pertinent international labour 
standards. Yet the Recommendation is deficient at the level of regulatory strategy. It is not as 
robust on what can be achieved, and how, by legal frameworks and techniques. Partially, this 
is because the Recommendation adopts, like the World Bank literature, a focus on the 
substantive standards that are enshrined in legal instruments, rather than on the intricacies 
of their scope, exceptions, distribution of legal obligations etc. It was concluded, then, that 
the formalisation project is primarily preoccupied with informal settings, rather than with 
informalisation of formal working relations or the balance that should be struck in regulatory 
policy between formalising and preventing further informalisation. 
 
A more robust conception of informalisation, then, must be demanded from 
international policy-makers, which better captures the contemporary dynamics of this 
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phenomena and in particular the associated regulatory supports. Informality narratives are 
significantly driving the debates on poor quality work, prominently at the global level. 
Informality policy is therefore a site with which it is vital for labour law scholars to engage and 
where the promise and risks of labour regulation can be explored. Formalisation, in particular, 
is a potential gateway to incorporating legal regulation into flagship global policy discourses, 
including towards the UN Sustainable Development Goals. This notion would, ideally, be 
fashioned to embrace sophisticated conceptions of informalisation, and of legal regulation, 
thus marrying the formalisation project with the objective of improving - or sustaining - job 
quality in the formal sector. In this regard, earlier contributions have called for a 
reconstructive labour law, which builds coherent jobs from fragmented working relations.126 
This reflection on informalisation suggests a parallel pre-emptive labour law, which should be 
integrated into formalisation policies and is targeted at preventing the unravelling of decent 
jobs. To some degree, this is a call for an alertness to, and defence of, the architecture of the 
mundane. In recent decades - perhaps unexpectedly - labour regulation scholars have been 
called on to produce refined typologies of the mechanisms and institutions that have 
supported, and can extend and surpass, the standard employment model. Intensified 
endeavours of this type are now vital if high-quality work is to be sustained - as aspiration and 
reality - in the face of the increasingly intense pressures towards informalisation.  
                                                          
126 McCann ‘New Frontiers of Regulation,’ (n 120), McCann and Murray (n 114). 
